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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MARTIAL LAw-TRIAL OF C1v1LIANS BY
MILITARY TRIBUNALS IN HAWAII-On the day of the attack on Pearl
Harbor, the Governor of Hawaii suspended the writ of habeas corpus
and declared martial law in that territory, acting under authority of the
Organic Act of Hawaii.1 At the Governor's request, the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department of the Army proclaimed himself
;Military Governor of the Islands, and established military tribunals
to try all violations ,of existing federal laws and military regulations
thereafter to be promulgated. The following day all civil courts were
closed, and the next day the President approved the Governor's action.
One week later, the law courts were permitted to resume jurisdiction
of non-jury civil suits; this jurisdiction was gradually widened in the
ensuing months to include all cases except those involving violation of
military regulations. Martial law was terminated in October of I 944.
These measures brought squarely before the Supreme Court for
the first time in its history 2 the question of whether the supplanting
of civil courts by military tribunals had_ been authorized by a federal
statute. In an opinion narrowly confined to that issue, the Supreme
Court held in the Duncan and White cases 8 that the Organic Act did

1 Section 67 of the' act provided that " ... the governor ... may, in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Territory or any part
thereof, under martial law until communication can be had with the President and
his decision thereon made known."
2 While the question was discussed in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (.71 U.S.) 2
(1866), the statute involved in that case authorized only the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus, and, in the . words of Chief' Justice Chase, ·seemed "to have been
framed on purpose to secure the trial of all offences of citizens by civil tribunals, in
states where these tribunals were not interrupted in the regular exercise of their functions." Id. at 136.
8 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, White v. Steer, (U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 606.
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not authorize the trial· by military tribunals of c1t1zens not directly
connected with the armed forces nor charged with violations of the laws
of war. Asserting that-"martial law" has no precise meaning, the Court,
speaking through Justice Black, concluded 'that Congress did not intend
by using that term to provide that courts of law could be supplanted by
military tribunals.
Military jurisdiction has been classified under three headings: military law, applicable to members of the armed forces and enemy belligerents; military government, exercised over occupied enemy territory; and martial law, applicable to domestic areas when needed to
preserve public order and .safety. Authority for the Hawaiian trials
was claimed under the third type of jurisdiction, distinguishing them
from trials of enemy belligerents under the laws of war, as in the
Quirin 4 and Y amashita11 cases, or trials of American citizens in civil
courts for violation of military regulations, as in the Hirabayashi case.6
The conclusion that martial law is not a term of precision accurately reflects a state of considerable confusion among the authorities
on the subject. Aside from the indiscriminate use of the term to include
military law and military government, there is sharp divergence of
views as to what martial law proper means and what it includes.7 It is
held by some to be absolute, and by others to be qualified; it has been
classified into punitive and preventive categories, although there is
.conflict as to whether it can ever be the former; it has been characterized as constitutional, unconstitutional, and extraconstitutional.8
Despite the established supremacy of civil over military power in
England and the United States, which has led to occasional assertions
that martial law has no place in our society, it is now generally recognized as being justified by necessity. 9 Without analyzing the numerous
theories on which martial law has been based, two conflicting theories
which have played a prominent part in its development _in this country
may profitably be examined.10
·
One theory, developed out of the common law,11 is based on the
4

11

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S. Ct. I (1942).
In the Matter of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 326 U.S. 693, 694, 66 S. Ct.

340 (1946).
6

Hiribayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S. Ct. 1375 (1943).
WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW 6-15, (1940).
8
RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAW FAILS 174-177 (1939).
9
"Martial law is the public law of necessity. Necessity calls it forth, necessity
justifies its existence, and necessity measures the extent and degree to which it may
be employed." WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAw 16 (1940).
1
Corwin, "Martial Law, Yesterday and Today," 47 PoL. Sci. Q. 95 at 99
•
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(1932).
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privilege of resisting illegal force with force, coupled with the duty
imposed upon public officers to suppress disturbance of the peace. Since
the duty exists, some defense must be permitted for officers using what
would normally be illegal force in restricting personal liberties in the
discharge of such duty.12 This defense is necessity, and is available to
military officers only when the orderly processes of civil government
are unable to cope with violence, so that a choice is presented between
martial law and no law at all, or, more accurately, between martial i;ule
.and the rule of lawless force. 18 Martial ·ni.le in this sense does not
supplant civil law, but fills a void created by the fajlure of civil law.
The duty of maintaining order falls to the' military by default, and the
powers exercised by the military are defined by the extent to which
th_eir normal superiors are unable to meet the exigencies of the situ·ation.
One test of the existence of necessity justifying martial rule under
this theory is that expressed in Ex parte Milligan: Martial rule can
never exist when the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed
exercise of their jurisdiction." This test, too, is rooted in English tradition. u It has, however, been subjected to considerable criticism, both
in England 15 and in this country,16 and was invoked in the Duncan and
White,cases only in Justice Murphy's concurring opinion. The qualifications, "proper and unobstructed". may be construed to mean that
the courts are capable of enforcing their orders through their own officers; under these conditions there is obviously no need for martial rule
if the commOJ]. law approach is adopted. Even if the assistance of the
military is required to enforce these orders, this does not necessitate
trying offenders in military courts.17
Under this theory, an act of Congress providing that the President
may declare martial law may be construed as authorizing nothing. It
may be simply declarative of the recogni~ed rule that martial rule is
justified under certain C(?nditions. If it purports to authorize it under
12
Fairman,-"The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency," 55 HARV,
L. REv. 1253 at 1256 (1942).
18
FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RuLE, 2d ed., 28-30 (1943).
u In the Fourteenth Century, the English Parliament recognized: "1. That in
time of peace
man ought to be.adjudged to death for treason, or any other offense
without being arraigned ·and put to answer. 2. That regularly, when the king's courts
are open, it is a time of peace in judgment of law." I HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 1st Am. edition, 346 (1847).
15
Ex parte Marais, 27 A.C. 109 at 114, 115 (1901).
16
FAIRMAN, THE LAW oi> MARTIAL RULE, 2d ed., 163-167 (1943),
17
Distinctions have been made between martial rule and military aid to the civil
authorities. FAIRMAN, id. 30; WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW '8
(1940).
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any other conditions, it is unconstitutional.18 Authorization comes from
factual necessity, not legislation; power resides in the executive by
default of normal civil process, and must be exercised by the military
forces as the sole remaining executive agency capable of maintaining
public order., The courts must ultimately determine whether _this
factual l).ecessity existed.19 In fulfilling his duty, the military officer
must judge for the moment the extent of his authority, but this decision
is subject to being overruled by a law court subsequently permitted
to resume its normal functions. In such an event, the officer may look to
the legislature for indemnification, but not for authorization. 20 . / ,
One rather curious result seems to follow: although the arrest and
detention, and even killing, of persons defying the military authorities may be justified by necessity, their trial by military tribunals
can never be lawful. 21 It may be necessary to detain a person in order
to maintain public safety and to restore the normal functioning of the
courts, but the determination of his guilt or innocence is still one of
those normal functions which must await the restoration of the courts.
While this may be small consolation to one languishing in a detention
barracks, it does at least assure him that he will live for the day of
reckoning.
The common law theory of martial law, with its attendant "open
court" test, is better adapted to rebellion or riot, wh~re illegal force is
applied from within the confines of the territory subjected to martial
law, than to war, where armed force is applied from without those
confines. It focuses attention upon the territory itself to determine
18
"Just as martial law may not be declared when no necessity exists, so the declaration of martial law is not necessary to the validity of measures of military rule when the
necessity is actually present." WIENER, id. 19.
19
DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION,
8th ed., 286 (1915): " .•• the question whether the force employed was necessary or
excessive will, especially where death has ensued, be ultimately determined by a judge
and jury .••."
20
An example is the fining of General Jackson for contempt of court during his
exercise of martial rule at New Orleans, with subsequent indemnification by Congress.
21
"Soldiers may suppress a riot as they may resist an invasion, they may fight
rebels just as they may fight foreign enemies, but they have no right under the law
to inflict punishment for riot or rebellion." DICEY, INTRODUCTION To THE STUDY oF
THE LAW O.F THE CoNSTITUTION, 8th ed., 289 (1915). For arguments pro and con,
see RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAW FAILS 177-181 (1939). One explanation for the
apparent conflict between Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 235 (1909),
holding that a state governor's determination that a state of insurrection exists is conclusive, and Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 53 S. Ct. 190 (1932), holding
that the question whether he has exceeded the limits of military discretion in instituting martial rule will be considered by the courts, is that the latter case involved
punitive measures while the former did not.
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·whether a state of facts exists requiring the use of military force to insure the public safety. Logically, the approach of an enemy fleet or ,
even the actual arrival of incendiary bombs, need not interrupt the
normal, orderly processes of civil courts, and may therefore create no
n~cessity for instituting martial rule.
A second theory, more suited to the emergency of w~r, is that
martial law ·may be used to implement the war powers vested by the
Constitution in Congress and the President. The question under this
view is not whether military force is needed to meet an internal disturbance which has rendered civil government impotent, but whether
martial law is required to repel an external force which threatens its
overthrow. Carried to its logical extreme, this argument might justify
dispensing with jury trials if they necessitated workers' absenting themselves from war plants to serve on juries; under the common law theory, jury trials could never be replaced so long as they were capable
of administering justice. The war power approach to the use of martial
law underlies the diss.enting opinion in the Duncan and White cases.22
The President's powers as Commander-in-Chief may be sufficiently great to warrant his imposition of martial law without Congressional authority. 23 Although at one time there was authority for the
view that his determination of the necessity for its imposition was conclusive,24 it is now established that the courts will consider whether he
has abused his discretion. It also seems well settled that he cannot
provide for punitive martial law without Congressional authority. 25
It remains an open question whether martial law invoked under an
act of Congress expressly authorizing the substitution of military for
civil courts would be upheld. A strong dissent in the Milligan case
indicates ,that it would be. In the Duncan and White cases, only Justice Murphy's opinion denies that Congress has this power, although
some of the language in the majority opinion also indicates that the
22
"That conditions of war and the means of meeting its emergencies were within
the contemplation of the Constitution of tlie United States is shown by the broad
authority vested in the President of the United States as Chief Executive and as Commander in Chief of the ·Army and N_avy and in the war powers of the Congress and
the Chief Executive to preserve the safety of the nation in time of war." 66 S. Ct.
606 at 625 (1946).
28
Prize Cases, 2 Black (67 U.S.) 635 (1862).
24 WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW 24 (1940). "While, even
in the conduct of war, there are many lines of jurisdiction to draw between. the proper
spheres of legislative, executive and judicial action, it seems clear that at least on an
active battle field, the executive discretion to determine policy is there intended by the
Constitution to be supreme." 66 S. Ct. 606 at 624 (1946).
25
While this conclusion does not necessarily follow from Sterling v. Constantin,
it seems implicit in the majority opinion in the Duncan and White cases.

COMMENTS

91

power does not exist. 26 Decisions arising out of the defense measures
taken on the Pacific Coast 21 indicate that civil liberties may be considerably restricted under the war power, and that military commanders
will be allowed a wide range of discretion in determining what measures are required for the national defense. It is possible that military
tribunals might be established by federal statute under the war power
without using the term, "martial law." 28 Certainly the "open court"
doctrine of the Milligan case has been undermined, and the way at
least remains open under the war power to extend military jurisdiction
beyond the limits contemplated by the common law theory of martial .
law.
Robert Cardon
26 "Congress prior to the time of the enactment of the Organic Act had only once
authorized the supplanting of the courts by military tribunals. Legislation to that effect
was enacted immediately after the South's unsuccessful attempt to secede from the
Union.' Insofar as that legislation applied to the Southern States after the war was at
an end it was challenged by a series of Presidential vetoes as vigorous as any in the
country's history. And in order to prevent this Court from passing on the constitutionality of this legislation Congress found it necessary to curtail our appellate jurisdiction." 66 S. Ct. 606 at 6 l 5 ( l 946).
27 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S. Ct. 1375 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944).
28 "Yet it may be asked what use martial law henceforward will have if the
Supreme Court holds that without it such extreme measures as a discriminatory curfew
and evacuation were permissible? If under a theory of war power such regulation is constitutional, then the very concept of martial law is outmoded and unnecessary." Wolfson, "Legal Doctrine, War Power, and Japanese Evacuation," 32 KY. L.J. 328 at 337
(1944).

